Free RAT

A little while ago I came across this website: hxxps://domin-remote[.]online

The domain was registered yesterday via hostinger. To date it has not been reported.

Matrix reported it on urlscan.io 15 hours ago.

Domain Name: DOMIN-REMOTE.ONLINE
Registry Domain ID: D424887618-CNIC
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.hostinger.com
Registrar URL: https://www.hostinger.com/
Updated Date: 2024-01-15T10:57:55.0Z
Creation Date: 2024-01-15T10:57:50.0Z
Registry Expiry Date: 2025-01-15T23:59:59.0Z
Registrar: HOSTINGER operations, UAB
Registrar IANA ID: 1636
Domain Status: serverTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#serverTransferProhibited
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Domain Status: addPeriod https://icann.org/epp#addPeriod
Registrant Organization: Privacy Protect, LLC (PrivacyProtect.org)
Registrant State/Province: MA
Registrant Country: US
Registrant Email: Please query the RDDS service of the Registrar of Record identified in this output for information on how to contact the Registrant, Admin, or Tech contact of the queried domain name.
Admin Email: Please query the RDDS service of the Registrar of Record identified in this output for information on how to contact the Registrant, Admin, or Tech contact of the queried domain name.
Tech Email: Please query the RDDS service of the Registrar of Record identified in this output for information on how to contact the Registrant, Admin, or Tech contact of the queried domain name.
Name Server: NS6.NL.HOSTSAILOR.COM
Name Server: NS5.NL.HOSTSAILOR.COM
DNSSEC: unsigned
Billing Email: Please query the RDDS service of the Registrar of Record identified in this output for information on how to contact the Registrant, Admin, or Tech contact of the queried domain name.
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: domains@hostinger.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +370.68424669
URL of the ICANN Whois Inaccuracy Complaint Form: https://www.icann.org/wicf/
>>> Last update of WHOIS database: 2024-01-16T17:42:53.0Z <<<

For more information on Whois status codes, please visit https://icann.org/epp

>>> IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE DEPLOYMENT OF RDAP: please visit
https://www.centralnic.com/support/rdap <<<

The Whois and RDAP services are provided by CentralNic, and contain
information pertaining to Internet domain names registered by our
our customers. By using this service you are agreeing (1) not to use any
information presented here for any purpose other than determining
ownership of domain names, (2) not to store or reproduce this data in
any way, (3) not to use any high-volume, automated, electronic processes
to obtain data from this service. Abuse of this service is monitored and
actions in contravention of these terms will result in being permanently
blacklisted. All data is (c) CentralNic Ltd (https://www.centralnic.com)

Access to the Whois and RDAP services is rate limited. For more
information, visit https://registrar-console.centralnic.com/pub/whois_guidance.

Here you can download the zip file containing everything.

This is the beginning of the attack from which it is possible to download the PHP sources (sorry for “PHP” 😉 ) and the malware for Android, used for the attack.

The malware is a RAT and the sources represent its C2.

The C2 code is simple and was probably written by a person with little experience, even if he defines himself as a “hacker” while I see him more as a “newbie” with little hope.

Inside you will find everything you need, keys, logs, other domains involved, in short, if anyone has more time than me and wants to find out more, let me know, maybe they could collaborate on this article and enrich it 🙂

Attack on Iranian bank customers

Given that the Iranian regime disgusts me, as does every theocracy, I dedicate time to this kit because it has interesting features and because I think that we all owe solidarity to the Iranian population, persecuted by a fascist regime.

After this introduction, let’s move on to this kit. Matrix downloaded it from the e-h-r-a-z-c[.]org domain around 9pm today (January 14, 2023). The domain was registered via hostinger.com

At the time of writing this article (about two hours have passed since the kit was found) the web site is inactive.

Inside the kit there are the PHP sources that make up the phishing site and a malware for Android.

The kit targets customers of several banks.

In the PHP sources we find the token to which the stolen credentials are sent.

The site is not listed on urlscan.io because at the time of the notification the site was already offline. I can say we downloaded the kit at the last second 🙂

The main goal of the attack was to install malware. This can also be deduced from the cloaking mechanism which redirects all non-Android devices to the cyber police website which deals with cyber security.

Phishing campaign based on .best domains

A new tool launched in recent days has made it possible to quickly detect an attack based on various .best domains.
Matrix had reported these domains on urlscan.io several hours ago.

From the evidence gathered in recent minutes, it appears that the attack targeted customers of the US bank America First Credit Union.

Below is the list of domains involved.

  • ab5[.]best
  • ab8[.]best
  • ah4[.]best
  • aj0[.]best
  • aj2[.]best
  • ak0[.]best
  • al6[.]best
  • al7[.]best
  • an6[.]best
  • ao7[.]best
  • ar0[.]best
  • ay5[.]best
  • aw5[.]best
  • az4[.]best
  • bb3[.]best
  • bc0[.]best
  • bd5[.]best
  • be7[.]best
  • bf8[.]best
  • br5[.]best
  • bs6[.]best
  • bv3[.]best
  • bv6[.]best
  • bw5[.]best
  • bx3[.]best
  • eo0[.]best
  • ed4[.]best
  • ed5[.]best
  • ei2[.]best
  • ei5[.]best
  • ei8[.]best
  • ej5[.]best
  • el0[.]best
  • em3[.]best
  • en8[.]best
  • eo0[.]best
  • er0[.]best
  • er5[.]best
  • eu5[.]best
  • eu9[.]best
  • ev2[.]best
  • ex9[.]best
  • fa5[.]best
  • fa7[.]best
  • fa9[.]best
  • fb3[.]best
  • fg0[.]best
  • fj7[.]best

Just went online

These domains were registered last week but the scripts have only now been uploaded. This seems like suspicious behavior to me…

  • hxxp://marqatha[.]com
  • hxxp://marqrdha[.]com
  • hxxp://vaiqsant[.]com
  • hxxp://vaiqbant[.]com
  • hxxp://mawqreha[.]com
  • hxxp://vazxant[.]com
  • hxxp://marqrxha[.]com
  • hxxp://marqreha[.]com

The Italian job

Today I downloaded a phishing kit hosted by cPanel, intended to scam BBVA customers.

The kit is a 2022 panel.

Very often the kits downloaded from cPanel are written in Italian, regardless of the company targeted. During this period I also noticed how these criminals operate during office hours and seem to operate in the Italian time zone.

Given the importance of Italian organized crime and the necessary structure to collect the fruits of this type of fraud, perhaps one might think that Italian organized crime has opened its own IT department?

Wave of scams related to the war in Palestine

In recent days I have noticed that many sites related to the situation in Palestine are being created, especially many sites asking to support the Palestinian population with donations or purchases of material.

There are certainly many people who try to help using the Internet, but many are taking advantage of this tragedy to scam people who want to help those who are suffering.

Wanting to give an example of a suspicious site, I started taking a look at this site “impact-palestine.com”.

The domain was registered two days ago.

I don’t take the HTTPS certificate into consideration because it might be normal to use a certificate of this type for a voluntary association.

The name of the site recalls that of IMPACT initiatives (https://www.impact-initiatives.org/). The text is in English but in some places there are texts in Russian.

We read about funds raised…

… but their wallet says otherwise.

It is also noted as asking for donations only via cryptocurrencies.

The links to their alleged social accounts lead to accounts of other well-known associations or to non-existent accounts.

If you are able and willing to help, I suggest you rely on well-known associations. For example https://www.amnesty.org/en/ or https://www.savethechildren.net/

No more Twitter!!

After more than 400,000 tweets, the blue bird platform suspended my account for violating the counterfeit goods rules.

I’ve decided to move the publishing of reports to urlscan.io.

In the new release I made some changes to the publishing platform, the main one for users is that now sites that don’t have a default page are also published. These are the so-called “opendir”.

Update from Twitter account

November 2022 saw a new update of “The Smith Project” solution.

This update makes it possible to identify a new type of malicious sites that spread malicious Android app and Windows executable.

The increase in tweets from October to November was almost 100%. If compared with September the increase was more than 200%

It’s hard to find time to work on this project, however there are many ideas. Stay tuned!

Typo generator online

I just released a web application for generating typos. This service exposes a resource that can simply be invoked by the browser or any http client (eg curl) and returns a list of strings that look like the original string. For now the request is not that much customizable, the next releases will allow you to configure the algorithm that generates the strings.

The application can be found here: http://typ0generat0r.com

The application is available to everyone with few limitations:

  • no more than one call every three minutes for each client
  • maximum length of the text to be used to generate the typos must be eight characters

To overcome these limits you can ask me for a key through which you can use the application without limitations,