The guy who set up this phishing site probably grew up being told he was a smart kid. It wasn’t true π


The guy who set up this phishing site probably grew up being told he was a smart kid. It wasn’t true π


For some time now, Iβve been sharing a public GitHub repository containing some of the indicators I find within the Matrix storage. Since this is a manual process, I havenβt yet found the time to automate it, I add a few indicators every now and then.
One thing Iβve noticed while working on this repository is that there are clearly close relationships between the kits; this is because the actors are limited in number and often use both new and old indicators (for example, emails and keys used to access external services). By pivoting on these, you can easily link different attacks together.
So I decided to create this page where you can browse the indicators in graphical format:
https://ecarlesi.github.io/ioc

The search field allows you to enter free-form text, which serves as the filter applied to the graph you see.


I hope you find it useful π
Some time ago, I wrote a somewhat provocative article about the lack of support that email providers generally offer when one of their accounts is involved in illegal activities. Today, I feel compelled to write this article to share a very positive experience I had with an email provider, my favorite, Proton.
I opened a support ticket reporting email accounts being used in phishing kits, provided them with the relevant information, and they responded by asking for more details. After just a few messages, they informed me that they would take action.
I agree that Proton is really great, but in my opinion, other providers could also devote a little more attention to the security of their accounts; Iβm not saying they should prevent these issues, but at least react when evidence is presented to them.
If you want to see a list of email accounts that have been active for months, you can find some here:
I haven’t had much time to write here lately, but today I noticed something funny (maybe). I came across this website: bankstatementkit[.]com

It reminded me of a website from many years ago that allowed users (who weren’t too bright) to check if their credit card had been compromised, obviously by asking them to enter all their card details.
Todayβs site, on the other hand, lets users upload their credit card statement as a PDF to get an Excel file in return. At the bottom, they promise to be honest, not to save anything, and to comply with the GDPR. That might even be true, but Iβve never seen a criminal website admit it publicly.
I have no reason to believe that this website isnβt a legitimate business. Its aims are, in my opinion, so absurd, and the idea that someone would upload their own bank statement is so ridiculous that it leads me to believe there arenβt actually any criminals behind it.
If itβs a legitimate business, I wish them the best of luck. If theyβre criminals and manage to get their hands on someoneβs data, weβll be able to say that, once again, itβs not just the criminals who are bad, but the users who are stupid, too.
I don’t know much about how Clawdbot works. I’ve never installed it and I’ve only had a quick look at the repo.
Let’s just say I know I don’t know shit about it.
But do so many people really need to expose the service on the internet? Without any restrictions whatsoever?

please, don’t call every idiot who commits crimes using a computer a “hacker”. I know I’m harping on about this, but it’s very important to me. The term “hacker” refers to an individual who studies, commits himself, and is driven by an indomitable passion. The press, however, decided that this term was appropriate for any idiot who commits a crime using a computer.
Today I bring you a splendid example of an idiot that some will call a “hacker”.
This genius registered a domain (helpvdeskerify247[.]com) to install a kit to steal credentials from Bank of America customers. Matrix discovered the domain and reported it as “opendir.”

The domain was flagged on urlscan some minutes after registration π

Since it was clearly suspicious, Matrix continued monitoring. After a few hours Matrix intercepts a change on the site and identifies a cloacker, which it then reports as a possible threat.

A day later, the criminal takes down the site and exposes the kit: Matrix then intercepts, downloads, and analyzes it. It identifies and reports it, highlighting the threat.

Here, the criminal already proves he’s no genius. Analyzing the kit, however, reveals a hidden gemβ¦ To secure the credentials, the kit uses a Telegram bot:
7937236406:AAGHUl2hThlX_SuxhkIuxVk2ZhAPoxuW8Ao
Okay, nothing unusual, so what’s the strangeness? The genius, instead of leaving the information in the bot’s queue, decides to record a callback. The attack therefore seems a bit more complex than usual. But here’s where the genius shines: the callback is based on the same domain where the kit is located!

So, after traveling around the world, where did the stolen credentials end up? In a damn JSON file on the same machine. π π π

I challenge anyone here to use the term “hacker” to describe this guy!!!
Besides, after two days, GSB and VT continue to ignore this domain. Very well, I’d say.

Searching for something else I found a notification for a malware detected months ago, the thing that struck me was the name of the file: FixInternet.exe

The first thought was this:

In the following article I talk about some approaches to mitigate the damage from a criminal attack. I am not sure if what I am talking about is legal in all countries, so do your research first. Or use a VPS in Russia π
Telegram is one of the main tools used by criminals to receive stolen information through various types of attacks, including of course phishing sites.
Below I outline some simple actions we can take to mitigate Telegram bot-based attacks. But first let’s see how to use a token.
For this post I will use a token identified in these hours within a kit distributed on different domains:
Analyzing the deployment methods of the kit, we can see how the criminal registered the various domains and only after several days installed the kit. This in an attempt to avoid being intercepted. Fortunately, Matrix also manages these situations π

Let’s move on to the kit, as always it’s a piece of junk written in PHP. Inside we find the Telegram bot token to which stolen credentials are sent to unwary users.

Now let’s move on to the main topic of this article: we have a token, what do we do with it? First, let’s study. Here is the documentation on how to use bots: https://core.telegram.org/bots/api
Using VS Code and the amazing “REST Client” extension we can query bots and use it to mitigate criminal action.
First, using the “getMe” method I check if the token is active. The 200 return code and the Json in response indicate that the token is active and therefore ready to receive information from clients, including the phishing site itself.

When the unwary user enters their credentials into the phishing site, it sends the information to the Telegram bot. Two things can happen here: if there is a registered webhook, the information is sent to the resource indicated as the webhook, otherwise the information is kept in the bot’s message queue to be consumed via the “getUpdates” method.
Using the “getWebhookInfo” method we check the bot status and the possible presence of a webhook. In this case the webhook is not registered and therefore we must use the “getUpdates” method to download any messages present in the queue.

By calling the “getUpdates” method we see that there are no messages in the queue. If there were any, our call would have returned them to us by deleting them from the queue.

As mentioned, we have several ways to handle this situation. The first is to register a resource of our own as a webhook that will then receive the stolen information, allowing us to act promptly. For example, you could implement an alert system for the user to warn him that his credentials have been stolen and perhaps even deactivate his account and credit cards. As an alternative to registering your own webhook, you can implement a polling mechanism to download the stolen information, removing it from the criminal’s reach, and use it to mitigate the threat: as mentioned above, you can block the account, warn the user, and explain to them that they need to be careful.
Another approach is token deletion. I personally don’t like this approach because it prevents us from intercepting compromised accounts and therefore deprives us of the ability to act on users.
Today I found an email with an SVG attachment in my secondary email account. The account is Office 365 and the email was not in spam, this is not good, especially considering how much 365 costs! Anyway, back to the email, it was clearly suspicious also considering the attachment, an svg file with the name “Your-to-do-List.svg” supposedly sent to me by itself.

I immediately downloaded the file and opened it with Notepad++ (all this without the antivirus having anything to say about itβ¦), inside there was a script that through a simple algorithm made a redirect to a phishing site with the aim of stealing the credentials of the same Office 365 account.

The target URL is: hxxps://bzzrr[.]yiunwox[.]es/!7ijf9v9ehpNFEKt/$


When I tried to forward the message to my Gmail account, Google’s mail server correctly returns an error π

As always, avoid downloading and opening attachments if you are not sure of the source.
Yesterday I came back from a weekend in Latvia and now I have come across an attack on Artea, a Lithuanian bankβ¦ The Baltics are calling me π



Matrix has identified a series of patterns that have allowed them to quickly identify the various domains involved:
One of the sites used for the attack on Artea hosts an attack on ING Italia based on a variant of the same kit.
The kit is simple but decently done.

The comments are in Russian and the Telegram tokens used to transmit the stolen credentials are these:



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