I don’t know much about how Clawdbot works. I’ve never installed it and I’ve only had a quick look at the repo.
Let’s just say I know I don’t know shit about it.
But do so many people really need to expose the service on the internet? Without any restrictions whatsoever?
please, don’t call every idiot who commits crimes using a computer a “hacker”. I know I’m harping on about this, but it’s very important to me. The term “hacker” refers to an individual who studies, commits himself, and is driven by an indomitable passion. The press, however, decided that this term was appropriate for any idiot who commits a crime using a computer.
Today I bring you a splendid example of an idiot that some will call a “hacker”.
This genius registered a domain (helpvdeskerify247[.]com) to install a kit to steal credentials from Bank of America customers. Matrix discovered the domain and reported it as “opendir.”
The domain was flagged on urlscan some minutes after registration 😉
Since it was clearly suspicious, Matrix continued monitoring. After a few hours Matrix intercepts a change on the site and identifies a cloacker, which it then reports as a possible threat.
A day later, the criminal takes down the site and exposes the kit: Matrix then intercepts, downloads, and analyzes it. It identifies and reports it, highlighting the threat.
Here, the criminal already proves he’s no genius. Analyzing the kit, however, reveals a hidden gem… To secure the credentials, the kit uses a Telegram bot:
7937236406:AAGHUl2hThlX_SuxhkIuxVk2ZhAPoxuW8Ao
Okay, nothing unusual, so what’s the strangeness? The genius, instead of leaving the information in the bot’s queue, decides to record a callback. The attack therefore seems a bit more complex than usual. But here’s where the genius shines: the callback is based on the same domain where the kit is located!
So, after traveling around the world, where did the stolen credentials end up? In a damn JSON file on the same machine. 😀 😀 😀
I challenge anyone here to use the term “hacker” to describe this guy!!!
Besides, after two days, GSB and VT continue to ignore this domain. Very well, I’d say.
Searching for something else I found a notification for a malware detected months ago, the thing that struck me was the name of the file: FixInternet.exe
The first thought was this:
In the following article I talk about some approaches to mitigate the damage from a criminal attack. I am not sure if what I am talking about is legal in all countries, so do your research first. Or use a VPS in Russia 😀
Telegram is one of the main tools used by criminals to receive stolen information through various types of attacks, including of course phishing sites.
Below I outline some simple actions we can take to mitigate Telegram bot-based attacks. But first let’s see how to use a token.
For this post I will use a token identified in these hours within a kit distributed on different domains:
Analyzing the deployment methods of the kit, we can see how the criminal registered the various domains and only after several days installed the kit. This in an attempt to avoid being intercepted. Fortunately, Matrix also manages these situations 🙂
Let’s move on to the kit, as always it’s a piece of junk written in PHP. Inside we find the Telegram bot token to which stolen credentials are sent to unwary users.
Now let’s move on to the main topic of this article: we have a token, what do we do with it? First, let’s study. Here is the documentation on how to use bots: https://core.telegram.org/bots/api
Using VS Code and the amazing “REST Client” extension we can query bots and use it to mitigate criminal action.
First, using the “getMe” method I check if the token is active. The 200 return code and the Json in response indicate that the token is active and therefore ready to receive information from clients, including the phishing site itself.
When the unwary user enters their credentials into the phishing site, it sends the information to the Telegram bot. Two things can happen here: if there is a registered webhook, the information is sent to the resource indicated as the webhook, otherwise the information is kept in the bot’s message queue to be consumed via the “getUpdates” method.
Using the “getWebhookInfo” method we check the bot status and the possible presence of a webhook. In this case the webhook is not registered and therefore we must use the “getUpdates” method to download any messages present in the queue.
By calling the “getUpdates” method we see that there are no messages in the queue. If there were any, our call would have returned them to us by deleting them from the queue.
As mentioned, we have several ways to handle this situation. The first is to register a resource of our own as a webhook that will then receive the stolen information, allowing us to act promptly. For example, you could implement an alert system for the user to warn him that his credentials have been stolen and perhaps even deactivate his account and credit cards. As an alternative to registering your own webhook, you can implement a polling mechanism to download the stolen information, removing it from the criminal’s reach, and use it to mitigate the threat: as mentioned above, you can block the account, warn the user, and explain to them that they need to be careful.
Another approach is token deletion. I personally don’t like this approach because it prevents us from intercepting compromised accounts and therefore deprives us of the ability to act on users.
Today I found an email with an SVG attachment in my secondary email account. The account is Office 365 and the email was not in spam, this is not good, especially considering how much 365 costs! Anyway, back to the email, it was clearly suspicious also considering the attachment, an svg file with the name “Your-to-do-List.svg” supposedly sent to me by itself.
I immediately downloaded the file and opened it with Notepad++ (all this without the antivirus having anything to say about it…), inside there was a script that through a simple algorithm made a redirect to a phishing site with the aim of stealing the credentials of the same Office 365 account.
The target URL is: hxxps://bzzrr[.]yiunwox[.]es/!7ijf9v9ehpNFEKt/$
When I tried to forward the message to my Gmail account, Google’s mail server correctly returns an error 🙂
As always, avoid downloading and opening attachments if you are not sure of the source.
Yesterday I came back from a weekend in Latvia and now I have come across an attack on Artea, a Lithuanian bank… The Baltics are calling me 🙂
Matrix has identified a series of patterns that have allowed them to quickly identify the various domains involved:
One of the sites used for the attack on Artea hosts an attack on ING Italia based on a variant of the same kit.
The kit is simple but decently done.
The comments are in Russian and the Telegram tokens used to transmit the stolen credentials are these:
In the last few weeks I have noticed that attacks on Correios are constant. I have studied the matter a bit: it is the Brazilian state company that manages shipments and payments related to them.
The scam is always the same, attackers write to users saying that a shipment is blocked and that a small payment is needed to unblock it. What is interesting about this attack is that the user by entering the CPF (Cadastro de Pessoas FÃsicas) gets his data displayed on the page and this certainly appears to the user as something reliable.
The domain used for the attack is cpf-pendente[.]co[.]ua and it was registered few hours ago.
Domain ID:1161463_COUA-DRS
Domain Name:CPF-PENDENTE.CO.UA
Created On:22-Apr-2025 17:22:07 UTC
Last Updated On:22-Apr-2025 17:25:15 UTC
Expiration Date:22-Apr-2026 17:22:07 UTC
Sponsoring Registrar:NIC.UA LLC (nic-mnt-cunic)
Status:ok
Registrant ID:NICUA2550498EZZN-CUNIC
Registrant Name:<not disclosed>
Registrant Organization:<not disclosed>
Registrant Street1:<not disclosed>
Registrant Street2:<not disclosed>
Registrant Street3:<not disclosed>
Registrant City:<not disclosed>
Registrant State/Province:<not disclosed>
Registrant Postal Code:<not disclosed>
Registrant Country:<not disclosed>
Registrant Phone:<not disclosed>
Registrant Fax:<not disclosed>
Registrant Email:<not disclosed>
Admin ID:NICUA2550498EZZN-CUNIC
Admin Name:<not disclosed>
Admin Organization:<not disclosed>
Admin Street1:<not disclosed>
Admin Street2:<not disclosed>
Admin Street3:<not disclosed>
Admin City:<not disclosed>
Admin State/Province:<not disclosed>
Admin Postal Code:<not disclosed>
Admin Country:<not disclosed>
Admin Phone:<not disclosed>
Admin Fax:<not disclosed>
Admin Email:<not disclosed>
Billing ID:NICUA2550498EZZN-CUNIC
Billing Name:<not disclosed>
Billing Organization:<not disclosed>
Billing Street1:<not disclosed>
Billing Street2:<not disclosed>
Billing Street3:<not disclosed>
Billing City:<not disclosed>
Billing State/Province:<not disclosed>
Billing Postal Code:<not disclosed>
Billing Country:<not disclosed>
Billing Phone:<not disclosed>
Billing Fax:<not disclosed>
Billing Email:<not disclosed>
Tech ID:NICUA2550498EZZN-CUNIC
Tech Name:<not disclosed>
Tech Organization:<not disclosed>
Tech Street1:<not disclosed>
Tech Street2:<not disclosed>
Tech Street3:<not disclosed>
Tech City:<not disclosed>
Tech State/Province:<not disclosed>
Tech Postal Code:<not disclosed>
Tech Country:<not disclosed>
Tech Phone:<not disclosed>
Tech Fax:<not disclosed>
Tech Email:<not disclosed>
Name Server:VERA.NS.CLOUDFLARE.COM
Name Server:LLOYD.NS.CLOUDFLARE.COM
The first curiosity is that the archive is a RAR instead of a ZIP. Someone hoped to make life difficult for Matrix but I love writing code and this allows Matrix to open different types of archives, including obviously RAR 🙂
Aside from the type of archive, my curiosity about this kit was given by the functionality of extracting user data starting from the CPF. I do not know the Brazilian law but that from a simple number you can extract personal data seems unsafe to me.
The kit uses an external service to resolve the client data. This service I assume is part of the attack and probably uses another service in turn, perhaps legitimate or a leak from who knows where. This service is available at the domain anonimobusca[.]online. It was registered one week ago.
Domain Name: ANONIMOBUSCA.ONLINE
Registry Domain ID: D544101018-CNIC
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.namecheap.com
Registrar URL: https://namecheap.com
Updated Date: 2025-04-15T13:27:33.0Z
Creation Date: 2025-04-15T13:27:28.0Z
Registry Expiry Date: 2026-04-15T23:59:59.0Z
Registrar: Namecheap
Registrar IANA ID: 1068
Domain Status: serverTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#serverTransferProhibited
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Registrant Organization: Privacy service provided by Withheld for Privacy ehf
Registrant State/Province: Capital Region
Registrant Country: IS
Registrant Email: Please query the RDDS service of the Registrar of Record identified in this output for information on how to contact the Registrant, Admin, or Tech contact of the queried domain name.
Admin Email: Please query the RDDS service of the Registrar of Record identified in this output for information on how to contact the Registrant, Admin, or Tech contact of the queried domain name.
Tech Email: Please query the RDDS service of the Registrar of Record identified in this output for information on how to contact the Registrant, Admin, or Tech contact of the queried domain name.
Name Server: DAPHNE.NS.CLOUDFLARE.COM
Name Server: IGNAT.NS.CLOUDFLARE.COM
DNSSEC: unsigned
Billing Email: Please query the RDDS service of the Registrar of Record identified in this output for information on how to contact the Registrant, Admin, or Tech contact of the queried domain name.
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@namecheap.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.9854014545
URL of the ICANN Whois Inaccuracy Complaint Form: https://www.icann.org/wicf/
>>> Last update of WHOIS database: 2025-04-23T07:20:24.0Z <<<
For more information on Whois status codes, please visit https://icann.org/epp
>>> IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE DEPLOYMENT OF RDAP: please visit
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The registration data available in this service is limited. Additional
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The Whois and RDAP services are provided by CentralNic, and contain
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To obtain the user information, the phishing kit, uses a specific resource exposed by the second domain
Another aspect is related to how payments are collected. The kit does not in fact collect itself he payment data. The user makes the payment using systems that manage transactions. The services used to perform the transactions are:
The URLs used are:
Both services have been active for a short time, they use cheap providers for domain management and have free certificates. In short, I would say that nothing seems to give trust to these services.
Domain Name: PAGUESAFE.COM
Registry Domain ID: 2805917900_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.rrpproxy.net
Registrar URL: http://www.key-systems.net
Updated Date: 2025-01-22T02:22:32Z
Creation Date: 2023-08-14T19:17:29Z
Registry Expiry Date: 2025-08-14T19:17:29Z
Registrar: Key-Systems GmbH
Registrar IANA ID: 269
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@key-systems.net
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +49.68949396850
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Name Server: NS1.DNS-PARKING.COM
Name Server: NS2.DNS-PARKING.COM
DNSSEC: unsigned
URL of the ICANN Whois Inaccuracy Complaint Form: https://www.icann.org/wicf/
>>> Last update of whois database: 2025-04-23T07:20:37Z <<<
For more information on Whois status codes, please visit https://icann.org/epp
NOTICE: The expiration date displayed in this record is the date the
registrar's sponsorship of the domain name registration in the registry is
currently set to expire. This date does not necessarily reflect the expiration
date of the domain name registrant's agreement with the sponsoring
registrar. Users may consult the sponsoring registrar's Whois database to
view the registrar's reported date of expiration for this registration.
TERMS OF USE: You are not authorized to access or query our Whois
database through the use of electronic processes that are high-volume and
automated except as reasonably necessary to register domain names or
modify existing registrations; the Data in VeriSign Global Registry
Services' ("VeriSign") Whois database is provided by VeriSign for
information purposes only, and to assist persons in obtaining information
about or related to a domain name registration record. VeriSign does not
guarantee its accuracy. By submitting a Whois query, you agree to abide
by the following terms of use: You agree that you may use this Data only
for lawful purposes and that under no circumstances will you use this Data
to: (1) allow, enable, or otherwise support the transmission of mass
unsolicited, commercial advertising or solicitations via e-mail, telephone,
or facsimile; or (2) enable high volume, automated, electronic processes
that apply to VeriSign (or its computer systems). The compilation,
repackaging, dissemination or other use of this Data is expressly
prohibited without the prior written consent of VeriSign. You agree not to
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query the Whois database except as reasonably necessary to register
domain names or modify existing registrations. VeriSign reserves the right
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operational stability. VeriSign may restrict or terminate your access to the
Whois database for failure to abide by these terms of use. VeriSign
reserves the right to modify these terms at any time.
The Registry database contains ONLY .COM, .NET, .EDU domains and
Registrars.
Domain Name: paguesafe.com
Registry Domain ID: 2805917900_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.rrpproxy.net
Registrar URL: https://www.hostinger.com/contacts
Updated Date: 2025-01-22T02:22:32Z
Creation Date: 2023-08-14T19:17:29Z
Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2025-08-14T19:17:29Z
Registrar: Key-Systems GmbH
Registrar IANA ID: 269
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abusereport@key-systems.net
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +49.68949396850
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Registry Registrant ID: Not Available From Registry
Registrant Name: On behalf of paguesafe.com OWNER
Registrant Organization: c/o whoisproxy.com
Registrant Street: 604 Cameron Street
Registrant City: Alexandria
Registrant State/Province: VA
Registrant Postal Code: 22314
Registrant Country: US
Registrant Phone: +64.48319528
Registrant Phone Ext:
Registrant Fax:
Registrant Fax Ext:
Registrant Email: 20f3221829e93b3a03d0a4bba3bcdb0491e3ed52d42dd6bff0f8d15a0f6fc777@paguesafe.com.whoisproxy.org
Registry Admin ID: Not Available From Registry
Admin Name: On behalf of paguesafe.com ADMIN
Admin Organization: c/o whoisproxy.com
Admin Street: 604 Cameron Street
Admin City: Alexandria
Admin State/Province: VA
Admin Postal Code: 22314
Admin Country: US
Admin Phone: +64.48319528
Admin Phone Ext:
Admin Fax:
Admin Fax Ext:
Admin Email: 20f3221829e93b3a03d0a4bba3bcdb0491e3ed52d42dd6bff0f8d15a0f6fc777@paguesafe.com.whoisproxy.org
Registry Tech ID: Not Available From Registry
Tech Name: On behalf of paguesafe.com TECH
Tech Organization: c/o whoisproxy.com
Tech Street: 604 Cameron Street
Tech City: Alexandria
Tech State/Province: VA
Tech Postal Code: 22314
Tech Country: US
Tech Phone: +64.48319528
Tech Phone Ext:
Tech Fax:
Tech Fax Ext:
Tech Email: 20f3221829e93b3a03d0a4bba3bcdb0491e3ed52d42dd6bff0f8d15a0f6fc777@paguesafe.com.whoisproxy.org
Registry Billing ID: Not Available From Registry
Billing Name: On behalf of paguesafe.com BILLING
Billing Organization: c/o whoisproxy.com
Billing Street: 604 Cameron Street
Billing City: Alexandria
Billing State/Province: VA
Billing Postal Code: 22314
Billing Country: US
Billing Phone: +64.48319528
Billing Phone Ext:
Billing Fax:
Billing Fax Ext:
Billing Email: 20f3221829e93b3a03d0a4bba3bcdb0491e3ed52d42dd6bff0f8d15a0f6fc777@paguesafe.com.whoisproxy.org
Name Server: ns1.dns-parking.com
Name Server: ns2.dns-parking.com
DNSSEC: unsigned
Whoisprivacy: 1
URL of the ICANN WHOIS Data Problem Reporting System: https://wdprs.internic.net/
>>> Last update of WHOIS database: 2025-04-23T07:20:56Z <<<
For more information on Whois status codes, please visit https://www.icann.org/epp
To contact the registered registrant please proceed to:
https://www.domain-contact.org
Please register your domains at; https://www.hostinger.com/contacts
This data is provided by
for information purposes, and to assist persons obtaining information
about or related to domain name registration records.
does not guarantee its accuracy.
By submitting a WHOIS query, you agree that you will use this data
only for lawful purposes and that, under no circumstances, you will
use this data to
1) allow, enable, or otherwise support the transmission of mass
unsolicited, commercial advertising or solicitations via E-mail
(spam) or
2) enable high volume, automated, electronic processes that apply
to this WHOIS server.
These terms may be changed without prior notice.
By submitting this query, you agree to abide by this policy.
Domain Name: ATLASPAGAMENTOS.COM
Registry Domain ID: 2936397696_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.godaddy.com
Registrar URL: http://www.godaddy.com
Updated Date: 2024-11-26T21:51:12Z
Creation Date: 2024-11-22T20:48:06Z
Registry Expiry Date: 2025-11-22T20:48:06Z
Registrar: GoDaddy.com, LLC
Registrar IANA ID: 146
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@godaddy.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: 480-624-2505
Domain Status: clientDeleteProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientDeleteProhibited
Domain Status: clientRenewProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientRenewProhibited
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Domain Status: clientUpdateProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientUpdateProhibited
Name Server: ARYA.NS.CLOUDFLARE.COM
Name Server: BRETT.NS.CLOUDFLARE.COM
DNSSEC: unsigned
URL of the ICANN Whois Inaccuracy Complaint Form: https://www.icann.org/wicf/
>>> Last update of whois database: 2025-04-23T07:21:52Z <<<
For more information on Whois status codes, please visit https://icann.org/epp
NOTICE: The expiration date displayed in this record is the date the
registrar's sponsorship of the domain name registration in the registry is
currently set to expire. This date does not necessarily reflect the expiration
date of the domain name registrant's agreement with the sponsoring
registrar. Users may consult the sponsoring registrar's Whois database to
view the registrar's reported date of expiration for this registration.
TERMS OF USE: You are not authorized to access or query our Whois
database through the use of electronic processes that are high-volume and
automated except as reasonably necessary to register domain names or
modify existing registrations; the Data in VeriSign Global Registry
Services' ("VeriSign") Whois database is provided by VeriSign for
information purposes only, and to assist persons in obtaining information
about or related to a domain name registration record. VeriSign does not
guarantee its accuracy. By submitting a Whois query, you agree to abide
by the following terms of use: You agree that you may use this Data only
for lawful purposes and that under no circumstances will you use this Data
to: (1) allow, enable, or otherwise support the transmission of mass
unsolicited, commercial advertising or solicitations via e-mail, telephone,
or facsimile; or (2) enable high volume, automated, electronic processes
that apply to VeriSign (or its computer systems). The compilation,
repackaging, dissemination or other use of this Data is expressly
prohibited without the prior written consent of VeriSign. You agree not to
use electronic processes that are automated and high-volume to access or
query the Whois database except as reasonably necessary to register
domain names or modify existing registrations. VeriSign reserves the right
to restrict your access to the Whois database in its sole discretion to ensure
operational stability. VeriSign may restrict or terminate your access to the
Whois database for failure to abide by these terms of use. VeriSign
reserves the right to modify these terms at any time.
The Registry database contains ONLY .COM, .NET, .EDU domains and
Registrars.
Domain Name: atlaspagamentos.com
Registry Domain ID: 2936397696_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.godaddy.com
Registrar URL: https://www.godaddy.com
Updated Date: 2024-11-22T15:48:06Z
Creation Date: 2024-11-22T15:48:06Z
Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2025-11-22T15:48:06Z
Registrar: GoDaddy.com, LLC
Registrar IANA ID: 146
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@godaddy.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.4806242505
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Domain Status: clientUpdateProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientUpdateProhibited
Domain Status: clientRenewProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientRenewProhibited
Domain Status: clientDeleteProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientDeleteProhibited
Registry Registrant ID: Not Available From Registry
Registrant Name: Registration Private
Registrant Organization: Domains By Proxy, LLC
Registrant Street: DomainsByProxy.com
Registrant Street: 100 S. Mill Ave, Suite 1600
Registrant City: Tempe
Registrant State/Province: Arizona
Registrant Postal Code: 85281
Registrant Country: US
Registrant Phone: +1.4806242599
Registrant Phone Ext:
Registrant Fax:
Registrant Fax Ext:
Registrant Email: https://www.godaddy.com/whois/results.aspx?domain=atlaspagamentos.com&action=contactDomainOwner
Registry Tech ID: Not Available From Registry
Tech Name: Registration Private
Tech Organization: Domains By Proxy, LLC
Tech Street: DomainsByProxy.com
Tech Street: 100 S. Mill Ave, Suite 1600
Tech City: Tempe
Tech State/Province: Arizona
Tech Postal Code: 85281
Tech Country: US
Tech Phone: +1.4806242599
Tech Phone Ext:
Tech Fax:
Tech Fax Ext:
Tech Email: https://www.godaddy.com/whois/results.aspx?domain=atlaspagamentos.com&action=contactDomainOwner
Name Server: ARYA.NS.CLOUDFLARE.COM
Name Server: BRETT.NS.CLOUDFLARE.COM
DNSSEC: unsigned
URL of the ICANN WHOIS Data Problem Reporting System: http://wdprs.internic.net/
>>> Last update of WHOIS database: 2025-04-23T07:22:01Z <<<
For more information on Whois status codes, please visit https://icann.org/epp
TERMS OF USE: The data contained in this registrar's Whois database, while believed by the
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To this I would like to add that the two graphical interfaces are practically the same.
Looking at what ends up in the Matrix network I noticed a kit that targets Kraken customers.
As usual, the victim is frightened with an alleged compromise of their account.
The interesting aspect of this kit is that instead of asking the victim to enter their wallet details, the application suggests the victim to schedule a phone meeting. The user is asked to leave their phone number and is even provided with an .ics file with the appointment details, so that the victim remembers not to make other commitments 😀
The user data is sent to a Telegram bot as usual.
Looking for updates received from bots we find several messages waiting to be read by the fraudster. Since the domain where we found the kit does not yet have the kit online, it means that there are other sites with the kit already in operation.
Searching Elastic for domains with “kraken” in their names that are managed by the same DNS server (dnspod.com) brought up several other domains including kraken-centre.com which of course has the kit already online.
Free time is less and less, nevertheless I try to dedicate at least a couple of hours every week to the analysis of the Matrix evidence. I dedicate some time to the analysis of phishing kits and to the sharing of the email and Telegram token indicators on my public ioc repo: https://github.com/ecarlesi/ioc.git
From this analysis a spontaneous question arises: why do the same accounts continue to be active over time? Does no one notice that they are being used for illicit purposes?
The obvious answer might be that Telegram is based in Dubai, founded by a Russian, maybe preventing or mitigating fraud is not at the forefront of their minds. Maybe. Let’s say the same goes for Yandex, they are Russian. Maybe. What I don’t understand though is why they don’t block Gmail and Yahoo accounts either, just to name two non-Russian companies.
Let’s take the segdairo as gmail dot com account for example. I personally found it in 5 different attacks, the first one dating back to May 13, 2024.
Later I found it in other kits within which I identified other indicators:
Not understanding why email accounts are blocked even when they are clearly involved in illicit activities, I tried to understand how to report a criminal email account. Searching on the internet I found some instructions from Google that talk about how to report an email received. However, I did not find how to report an email involved in illicit activities without having received any email from it in my Gmail account. I also found directions regarding Google Workspace accounts, which are very convenient, but this is not the case.
I finally found a link to the Internet Crime Complaint Center (ic3[.]gov). There is a form to report the event. It is now dinner time, given the length of the form, maybe I will do it after dinner.
Here I found something interesting: the Government explains how to recognize a legitimate Government domain, there is “.gov” and the padlock that indicates the use of https…
I would say not very well since every day there are thousands of new domains that meet these requirements 😀
At the end of a pretty busy day, I finally found a few minutes to check out the incoming notifications from Matrix. I noticed a kit that targets Kraken customers because their icon reminds me of the ghost from Pacman, and just today I got the vintage Pacman console 🙂
The domain used for the attack is krakeeen[.]top. It was registered three days ago and Matrix keep the monitoring active waiting for the kit. It arrives some hours ago. Thanks attacker 🙂
At the moment the only reports on this matter are those made by Matrix.
As usual, the kit is PHP based.
Every now and then someone tells me that my posts seem like I don’t love it! That’s not true, I really like PHP and often the code is badly written and therefore sucks.
I love PHP and its community!!!!!
As for the stolen credentials, the kit requires that they be sent to the email address hardeyholar47@gmail[.]com.
Of course I added it to the list that I hope you already know 🙂
Emiliano Carlesi's blog 
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